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Trust Planning and the Washington State Capital Gains
Tax
J. M. Coppieters*
INTRODUCTION
On April 25, 2021, the Washington state legislature enacted a new
state capital gains tax.1 Prior to the enactment of the new state capital gains
tax, Washington had been one of the few states that did not impose a tax
on either income or capital gains. The limitations imposed by the
Washington state constitution2 have forced the legislature to characterize
the tax as an excise tax, rather than treat it as an income tax as would the
federal government and every other state. Based on the statute’s structure
and its presentation as an excise tax, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, the legislature appears to have excluded both the trustees
and beneficiaries of non-grantor trusts from being subject to the tax.
Part I of this Article summarizes the history of the new capital gains
tax and its key provisions. Part II reviews the history and law regarding
grantor and non-grantor trusts, analyzes the new law as applied to nongrantor trusts, and concludes that neither the trustee nor the beneficiaries
of a non-grantor trust appear to be subject to the tax. Given the apparent
discrepancy, whether it is because of legislative oversight or an
unavoidable consequence of constitutional limitations, Part III explores
tax strategies that planners and clients might consider pursuing in the wake
of the new tax.
I. THE NEW WASHINGTON STATE CAPITAL GAINS TAX
“A capital gains tax has long been a goal of Washington state
progressives, who have criticized the regressive nature of the state’s tax

*

Jadrian Michael Coppieters, J.D., LL.M., is an Associate Attorney at Scarff Law Firm, PLLC. Many
thanks to Stuart Scarff, Joe Pew, Bob Mahon, and Mark McBride for their support and feedback.
1. Capital Gains Tax, ch. 196, 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229.
2. See WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (mandating tax uniformity); WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 2
(limiting property tax percentage).

24

2021]

Trust Planning

25

structure.”3 A capital gains tax has been introduced in each session of the
Washington house of representatives since 20124 and senate since 2015.5
Washington state Governor Jay Inslee incorporated the 2015 house
proposal into his 2017–2018 budget proposal, hoping to partly counteract
the regressive nature of Washington’s tax system and noting that
Washington is one of the few states without a tax on capital gains.6 His
proposal recommended a 7.9% tax on capital gains above $25,000
($50,000 for joint filers).7
Governor Inslee presented the same proposal again in his 2019–2021
budget proposal (increased to 9%)8 and 2021–2023 budget proposal.9 In
2021, the Washington senate introduced the Governor’s proposal with a
few amendments.10 The senate amended the bill to: (1) reduce the rate
from 9% to 7%; (2) increase the exclusion from $25,000 to $250,000; (3)
exempt sales of real estate; and (4) change the prior bill’s exemption for
sole proprietorship businesses to a more robust, small family-owned
business exemption.11 The bill passed the house after amendments and
adjustments. A brief deadlock between the house and senate was then
3. Paul Jones, Washington State Democrats Include Capital Gains Tax in Budget Proposals,
TAX NOTES (Mar. 31, 2021), https://www.taxnotes.com/tax-notes-today-state/capital-gains-andlosses/washington-state-democrats-include-capital-gains-tax-budget-proposals/2021/03/31/4c5sl
[https://perma.cc/7P4C-ZYJ4]; see also An Act Relating to Enacting an Excise Tax on Gains from the
Sale or Exchange of Certain Capital Assets: Hearing on S.B. 5096 Before the S. Comm. on Ways &
Means, 2021 Leg., 67th Sess. (Wash. 2021) [hereinafter Senate Hearing Jan. 14, 2021] (statement of
Scott Merriman, Legislative Liaison, Office of Financial Management) (“The Governor has put [this
bill] before [the Washington legislature] several times [as] a way to help balance the regressive tax
code that we’re all familiar with.”).
4. See H.B. 2563, 62nd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012) (5% tax); H.B. 1484, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2015) (7% tax); H.B. 2224, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (5% tax); H.B. 2186, 65th
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (7% tax); H.B. 2967, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2018) (7% tax);
H.B. 1172, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (8% tax); H.B. 1496, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.
2021) (9.9% tax).
5. See S.B. 5699, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2015) (7% tax); S.B. 6102, 64th Leg., Reg. Sess.
(Wash. 2015) (7% tax); S.B. 5929, 65th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017) (7% tax); S.B. 5314, 66th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2019) (8% tax); S.B. 5096, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021) (9% tax).
6. See JAY INSLEE, OFF. OF FIN. MGMT., 2017–19 BUDGET & POLICY HIGHLIGHTS 16 (2016).
7. Id.
8. See 9 Percent Capital Gains Tax on Individuals (2019-21 Proposal), OFF. OF FIN. MGMT.
(Mar.
15,
2021),
https://ofm.wa.gov/budget/state-budgets/gov-inslees-proposed-2019-21budgets/proposed-2019-21-budget-and-policy-highlights/revenue-changes/9-percent-capital-gainstax-individuals [https://perma.cc/96MW-HNQB].
9. See JAY INSLEE, OFF. OF FIN. MGMT., PROPOSED 2021–23 BUDGET & POLICY HIGHLIGHTS 63
(2020); 9% Capital Gains Tax on Individuals – 21–23 Budget Proposal, OFF. OF FIN. MGMT.,
https://ofm.wa.gov/budget/state-budgets/gov-inslees-proposed-2021-23-budgets/highlightsgovernor-inslees-2021-23-proposed-budget/revenue-changes-proposed-21-23-budget/9-capitalgains-tax-individuals-21-23-budget-proposal [https://perma.cc/5MNA-7BDF].
10. See S.B. 5096, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
11. Compare Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5096, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021) [hereinafter
E.S.S.B. 5096], with S.B. 5096, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
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resolved through a conference committee, with the final vote in the house
at 52–44 and the final vote in the senate at 25–24.12
The new tax is apportioned based on the character of the underlying
property (tangible vs. intangible) and the taxpayer’s residence, which is
determined by either (1) domicile (unless the taxpayer maintained a
permanent place of abode outside the state) or (2) physical presence in the
state over 183 days.13 Dispositions of tangible property are taxable if the
property is located in Washington, regardless of the taxpayer’s
residency.14 Tangible property outside the state may still be taxable if the
taxpayer resides in Washington and the property is or was located in the
state in the current or prior tax year.15 Capital gains from sales of intangible
property are taxable if the taxpayer is domiciled in Washington as of the
date of the sale.16
Tax returns are due at the same time as federal income tax returns—
April 15 or October 15 with an automatic 6-month extension.17 A 5%
failure-to-file penalty is imposed for each month the return is late, up to a
maximum of 25%.18 Failure to pay by April 15 will also incur penalties
and interest.
The bill contains several exemptions and deductions, the most
important of which are discussed in this section. First, as mentioned above,
there is a uniform standard exemption of the $250,000 in gains.
Interestingly, however, the increase in exclusion to $250,000 does not
appear to account for married couples filing jointly. The original bill
provided for an exclusion of $25,000, or $50,000 for married couples
filing jointly.19 The amended statute simply provides a flat exclusion of
$250,000 for both single taxpayers and married couples filing jointly.20
12.
See
S.B.
5096
Bill
History,
WASH.
STATE
LEGISLATURE,
https://app.leg.wa.gov/billsummary?BillNumber=
5096&Initiative=false&Year=2021 [https://perma.cc/V8CE-AZA4]; Larry Brant, The Colorful and
Continuing Journey of Senate Bill 5096—the New Washington State Capital Gains Tax, FOSTER
GARVEY (May 7, 2021), https://www.foster.com/larry-s-tax-law/colorful-continuing-journeywashington-capital-gains-tax [https://perma.cc/SU35-4JM3].
13. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 4(10)(a), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1231.
14. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 11(1)(a), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 12235–36.
15. Id.
16. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 11(1)(b), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1236.
17. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 12, 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1236–37.As with the
federal return, the extension applies to the return due date, not the tax payment date.
18. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 12(6)(a), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1237..
19. S.B. 5096, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2021).
20. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 7, 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1234. The plain language
of the statute is clear that married couples face a penalty, despite the claim of senate staff that the
amendment “just lifts [the exemption] up to $250,000 uniformly for all taxpayers.” Senate Hearing
Jan. 14, 2021, supra note 3 (statement of Jeffrey Mitchell, Senior Fiscal Counsel, Revenue
Coordinator, S. Comm. on Ways & Means).
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Second, sales of real estate are exempt, as are sales of business
entities to the extent of their directly owned real estate, which is intended
to be covered by the state real estate excise tax (REET) system.21
Third, there is a small charitable deduction available for charitable
gifts over $250,000 in a tax year.22 The deduction is capped at $100,000—
that is, after $350,000 in donations23—and the charity must be
“[p]rincipally directed or managed within the state of Washington.” 24
Fourth, there is a deduction for sales of all or substantially all (i.e.,
more than 90%) of an interest in a Qualified Family-Owned Small
Business (QFOSB) in which the taxpayer or a family member “materially
participates” in at least five of the preceding ten years.25 The taxpayer and
their family must own (1) 50% of the QFOSB; (2) 30% of the QFOSB, if
the business is owned at least 70% by two families; or (3) 30% of the
QFOSB, if the business is owned at least 90% by three families.26 The
taxpayer must have owned the interest for at least five years before the sale
or disposition. 27 Eligibility is restricted to businesses with less than $10
million in worldwide gross revenue in the past twelve months. 28
Fifth, Section 7(2) of the bill also provides a deduction for
“[a]mounts that the state is prohibited from taxing under the Constitution
of this state or the Constitution or laws of the United States.”29 Such
language has been present in almost all the capital gains tax bills
introduced in the Washington legislature. The provision presumably
intends to offer relief to taxpayers in the event the tax is ruled
unconstitutional by the courts.
Because of Washington’s unique constitutional provisions regarding
taxes, the legislature has been forced to characterize the tax as an excise
tax.30 Due to the tax’s structure and characterization, a dramatic and
irresolvable anomaly results between grantor and non-grantor trusts: while
a trust with a Washington-domiciled grantor is subject to the tax, a
similarly situated non-grantor trust is not subject to the tax even if the
settlor, trustee, and beneficiaries are all Washington domiciliaries.

21. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 6(1)–(2), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1232.
22. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 9(1), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1235.
23. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 9(2), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1235..
24. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 9(4)(b)(ii), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1235.
25. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 8(2)(d)(ii), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1234.
26. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 8(2)(f), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1234–35.
27. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 8(2)(d)(ii), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1234.
28. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 8(2)(d)(iii), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1234.
29. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 7(2), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1234.
30. See infra Section II.B.3.c.
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II. THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN GRANTOR AND NON-GRANTOR TRUSTS
A. Two Flavors of Trust (for Income Tax Purposes):
Grantor Trusts and Non-Grantor Trusts
For federal income tax purposes, the income generated by assets
within a trust are treated as owned either by the trustees of the trust (a nongrantor trust) or by another person or persons (a grantor trust). The
“grantor” is typically the person contributing assets to the trust. However,
the grantor can be any person holding powers sufficient to cause the trust
income to be attributable to them.
Taxpayers with high marginal income tax rates have long sought to
shift their income to other persons or entities with lower marginal tax rates.
In the early twentieth century, trusts became a popular vehicle to reduce
and eliminate income tax; by dividing assets between several trusts, a
taxpayer could lower the overall income tax on the assets because each
trust would be treated as its own taxpayer.31 The result did not go
unnoticed by Congress or the courts: “By the creation of trusts, incomes
[have] been so divided and subdivided as to withdraw from the
government the benefit of the graduated taxes and surtaxes applicable to
income when concentrated in a single ownership.”32
The Supreme Court took up the issue in several cases, each time
focusing on the taxpayer’s control over assets purportedly given away,
rather than ownership of legal title.33 The culmination was Helvering v.
Clifford, in which the taxpayer had established a trust for his wife’s benefit
for a term of five years.34 Income was to be distributed to her (either during
the term of the trust or at the end), and the principal was to revert to the
taxpayer after the termination of the trust.35 The taxpayer named himself
as trustee, which reserved the absolute discretion to distribute or
accumulate income, and purchase, sell, and manage all trust assets.36
Based on the broad definition of income in the Code, the Court held that
the trust’s income was taxable to the taxpayer because he retained almost
complete dominion and control over the property:
Since the income remains in the family and since the husband retains
control over the investment, he has rather complete assurance that the
31. See Laura E. Cunningham & Noël B. Cunningham, Tax Reform Paul McDaniel Style: The
Repeal of the Grantor Trust Rules 4–6 (Cardozo Legal Stud., Working Paper No. 328, 2011).
32. Burnet v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670, 675 (1933).
33. Id. at 677–79; see also Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930); Abraham S. Guterman,
The New Clifford Regulations, 1 TAX L. REV. 379, 381–85 (1946); Jay A. Soled, Reforming the
Grantor Trust Rules, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 375, 378–85 (2001).
34. Helvering v. Clifford, 309 U.S. 331, 332 (1940).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 332–33.
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trust will not effect any substantial change in his economic position.
It is hard to imagine that respondent felt himself the poorer after this
trust had been executed or, if he did, that it had any rational
foundation in fact. For as a result of the terms of the trust and the
intimacy of the familial relationship respondent retained the
substance of fully enjoyment of all the rights which previously he had
in the property.37

After Clifford and the resulting deluge of litigation, the Treasury
Department promulgated bright-line regulations delineating when grantor
trust status would apply.38 Congress eventually codified the grantor trust
rules in its 1954 overhaul of the Code as Sections 671 to 679, which are
summarized below.
Although historically grantor trust status was a quasi-punishment
imposed to attribute income to a taxpayer, trusts are now commonly
drafted to intentionally trigger grantor trust status.39 There are three
primary benefits to grantor trust status. First, trust income tax brackets
progress more quickly than the brackets for individuals and the maximum
marginal income tax rate (37%) for trusts applies to income over $13,050.
Most individuals are subject to lower marginal income tax rates, so grantor
trust status provides income tax savings. Second, by allocating income
taxes to the grantor, grantor trust status permits the assets in the trust to
grow more quickly. The grantor’s payment of income taxes is not treated
as an additional gift to the trust.40 Third, sales, loans, and transactions
between a grantor trust and the grantor are generally disregarded for
income tax purposes. Thus, estate planners can—and do—structure
transactions that are respected as bona fide for gift and estate tax purposes
but result in no change for income tax purposes.41
The types of interests causing grantor trust status under the Federal
Code are:
o reversionary interests in either principal or income;42

37. Id. at 335–36 (emphasis added).
38. See T.D. 5488, 1946-1 C.B. 19–25, amended by T.D. 5567, 1947-2 C.B. 9–13; Soled, supra
note 33, at 386–87.
39. Soled, supra note 33, at 397 (“Although tax advisors were at one time careful to avoid the
‘trap’ of grantor trust status, today the opposite is true. In a major role reversal, many tax advisors are
using the same care on behalf of some of their clients, but this time to ensure that the trusts their clients
establish are ‘defective’ for tax purposes.”).
40. See Rev. Rul. 2004-64, 2004-2 C.B. 7.
41. See Jay A. Soled & Mitchell Gans, Sales to Grantor Trusts: A Case Study of What the IRS
and Congress Can Do to Curb Aggressive Transfer Tax Techniques, 78 TENN. L. REV. 973, 985
(2011).
42. See 26 U.S.C. § 673 (to the extent in excess of five percent of the principal or income).
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o powers to control the beneficial enjoyment of either principal or
income without the approval or consent of an adverse party;43
o powers to purchase, exchange, or otherwise deal with trust
principle or interest for less than adequate and full consideration;44
o powers to borrow from trust principal or income without adequate
interest or security;45
o actual borrowing of trust principal or income without adequate
interest and security if the loan remains outstanding at the end of the
taxable year;46
o powers to revoke all or a portion of a trust;47 and
o if income is or may be distributed to the grantor or the grantor’s
spouse, held or accumulated for such future use, or paid for life insurance
premiums insuring the life of the grantor or the grantor’s spouse.48
However, the creator of a trust (i.e., the settlor) is not always the
grantor of a trust. Section 678 provides that a third party shall be treated
as the owner of any portion of a trust over which he or she “has a power
exercisable solely by himself to vest the corpus or the income therefrom
in himself.”49 Section 678 is a secondary attribution rule and does not
apply if Sections 673–677 treat the settlor as the grantor over income of
the trust.50 The third party is also treated as the grantor of the trust even if
they have released or modified such power if they have retained another
power that would, if retained by the settlor, cause the settlor to be treated
as the grantor under Sections 673–677.51
43. See 26 U.S.C. § 674.
44. See 26 U.S.C. § 675(1).
45. See 26 U.S.C. § 675(2).
46. See 26 U.S.C. § 675(3). The three powers under Code Section 675 (i.e., the power to deal
with trust assets for less than full and adequate consideration, the power to borrow without adequate
interest or security, and the actual borrowing without adequate interest and security) are referred to as
“administrative powers.”
47. See 26 U.S.C. § 676.
48. See 26 U.S.C. § 677; see generally Maurice Alexandre, A Case Method Restatement of the
New Clifford Regulations, 3 TAX L. REV. 189 (1947); Stephen R. Akers, Jonathan G. Blattmachr & F.
Ladson Boyle, Creating Intentional Grantor Trusts, 44 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 207, 258 (2009).
49. 26 U.S.C. § 678(a)(1).
50. See 26 U.S.C. § 678(b); see generally Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Mitchell M. Gans, & Alvina
H. Lo, A Beneficiary as Trust Owner: Decoding Section 678, 35 ACTEC J. 106, 108 (2009).
Subsection (b) also applies to a foreign trust or portion thereof over which a transferor is treated as
being the grantor under Section 679, taking priority over a third party holding a power under Section
678(a). Code Section 678 was added to the tax law as a result of Mallinckrodt v. Commissioner, 146
F.2d 1 (8th Cir. 1945), in which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the
beneficiary of a trust could be taxed as the owner of trust because he could essentially direct the timing
and amount of distributions from the trust. See Blattmachr, Gans & Lo, supra note 50, at 108.
51. See Treas. Reg. § 1.678(a)-1(a). Code Section 678 does not apply if the power is renounced
or disclaimed within a reasonable time after the powerholder first became aware of its existence. See
26 U.S.C. § 678(d).
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Although this Article refers generally to non-grantor trusts, note that
estates are taxed identically for income tax purposes. Distributions of
income from an estate to the beneficiaries are generally taxable to the
beneficiaries and otherwise taxable to the estate if retained and
undistributed. As a practical matter, there is (for now) a step-up in basis
on an individual taxpayer’s death, so little gain is likely to occur in most
estates.52
B. Non-Grantor Trusts and the New Tax
1. Only (Certain) Individuals Are Subject to the Capital Gains Tax
“Only individuals are subject to payment of the [new capital gains]
tax.”53 Furthermore, “[t]he tax imposed . . . applies to the sale or exchange
of long-term capital assets owned by the taxpayer, whether the taxpayer
was the legal or beneficial owner of such assets at the time of the sale or
exchange.”54 At first glance, the statute appears to apply to the trustee of a
non-grantor trust (as the legal owner of the trust’s assets), or alternatively
to the beneficiaries of the non-grantor trust (as the beneficial owners of the
trust’s assets).
However, the structure and language of the new law suggest a
different interpretation for three primary reasons. First, the history and
structure of the statute’s definitions suggest that trustees of non-grantor
trusts may have been intentionally excluded. For purposes of the new tax:
An individual is considered to be a beneficial owner of long-term
capital assets held by an entity that is a pass-through or disregarded
entity for federal tax purposes, such as a partnership, limited liability
company, S corporation, or grantor trust, to the extent of the
individual’s ownership interest in the entity as reported for federal
income tax purposes.55

The initial budget proposal from Governor Inslee did not intend to
tax trustees, although it did contemplate taxing beneficiaries if a
distribution of capital gain was made.56
52. See 26 USC § 1014.
53. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 5(1), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1231.
54. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 5(4)(a), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1232 (emphasis
added).
55. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 5(4)(b)(i), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1232.
56. See Capital Gains Tax Proposal Q&A, OFF. OF FIN. MGMT. (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://ofm.wa.gov/budget/state-budgets/gov-inslees-proposed-2021-23-budgets/highlightsgovernor-inslees-2021-23-proposed-budget/revenue-changes-proposed-21-23-budget/capital-gainstax-proposal-qa [https://perma.cc/U6UF-759E] (“Because a trust is not an individual subject to the
Washington capital gains tax, no Washington capital gains tax would be due on gains retained by the
trust. However, in some cases a non-grantor trust will distribute income that represents gain from the
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Second, the express application of the tax to solely individuals leads
to an anomaly between individual and institutional trustees, as stated in
Section 5(1) of the bill. If the trustees of non-grantor trusts must pay the
tax, a disparity would result between individual trustees and nonindividual trustees. For instance, a Washington-chartered trust company
serving as institutional trustee of a non-grantor trust would presumably
owe no Washington capital gains tax on the sale of a long-term capital
asset. To the author’s knowledge, no other state exempts entities from their
state-level taxes on income or capital gains, and therefore no other state
has this apparent discrepancy.
Third, the language of the statute and state constitutional limitations
suggest that the tax does not apply to trust beneficiaries, whether of a
grantor or non-grantor trust, because they are not included in the
enumerated list of beneficial owners. Under the new law:
An individual is considered to be a beneficial owner of long-term
capital assets held by an entity that is a pass-through or disregarded
entity for federal tax purposes, such as a . . . grantor trust, to the
extent of the individual’s ownership interest in the entity as reported
for federal income tax purposes.57

Beneficiaries of a non-grantor trust are not considered to have an
“ownership interest” in the trust “as reported for federal income tax
purposes.”58 They may report taxable income or gain to the extent
distributed by the trust, and the trustee will pay federal tax on the
remainder of undistributed income or gain.59 The Washington Supreme
Court has affirmed the canon expression unius est exclusio alterius: “As a
general rule, the expression of one thing in a constitution or statute
excludes all others.”60 The canon implies that “[w]here a statute
enumerates the persons or things to be affected by its provisions, there is
an implied exclusion of others and the natural inference follows that it is
not intended to be general.”61
By excluding beneficiaries from the express definition of “beneficial
owners,” the legislature has apparently excluded beneficiaries of nongrantor trusts from being the intended payors of the tax. Furthermore, as
sale of capital assets rather than retain the income. Individual beneficiaries will need to report
distributed long-term capital gain income under the proposed Washington capital gains tax.”).
57. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 5(4)(b)(i), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1232.
58. Id. The exception is a beneficiary grantor trust, in which a settlor creates a trust with powers
granted to one or more beneficiaries sufficient to cause the trust to be a grantor trust with respect to
those beneficiaries under 26 U.S.C. § 678. See infra Part III.B.3.
59. See HOWARD M. ZARITSKY, NORMAN LANE & ROBERT DANFORTH, FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION OF ESTATES AND TRUSTS ¶ 1.02 (2001).
60. State ex rel. Port of Seattle v. Dep’t of Pub. Serv., 95 P.2d 1007, 1012 (Wash. 1939).
61. Id.
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discussed in Section II.B.3.b below, there are serious state constitutional
issues affecting the imposition of the capital gains tax on the beneficiaries
of a non-grantor trust. To qualify as a permissible excise tax under the
Washington state constitution, a tax must be imposed “upon the voluntary
action of the person taxed in performing the act, enjoying the privilege[,]
or engaging in the occupation which is the subject of the excise . . . .”62 It
is doubtful the actions of a trustee of an irrevocable trust (who may be
domiciled in another state) will be considered the “voluntary action” of the
beneficiaries. The entire premise of a trust is the existence of a person
acting in a fiduciary capacity making decisions regardless of the consent
or objection of the beneficiaries.63
With a grantor trust, one or more persons is the deemed owner of the
trust’s assets for income tax purposes.64 The application of the capital
gains tax appears relatively simple for a grantor trust with a single grantor
(over the entire trust). For example, a settlor retaining administrative
powers—such as the power to borrow from the trust without adequate
interest or security, or the power to substitute assets of equivalent value—
would be deemed to be the grantor of the entire trust under Section 675.
As the complete owner of the trust for federal income tax purposes, the
settlor would owe Washington capital gains taxes on an applicable sale as
if the trust assets were their own property. The application is less clear for
grantors who are deemed to own only a portion of the trust for income tax
purposes. For instance, under Section 675(3), if the grantor of a trust
borrows trust corpus or income without adequate interest and security, and
has not repaid the entire loan (including interest) before the end of a tax
year, the trust is a grantor trust for that year with respect to the amount of
the loan.65 If a Washington-domiciled settlor borrowed 50% of the assets
of a trust in a year without adequate interest and security, and the trustee
made a sale in that same year triggering capital gains, presumably the
settlor would be allocated 50% of the gains, as the one-half grantor of the
trust. Without additional guidance from the Washington Department of

62. Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324, 332 (Wash. 1995).
63. However, in practice, it is curious the extent to which beneficiaries and friendly trustees
“collude.” In the most egregious circumstances, the trustee is merely a formality. The IRS has attacked
several estate planning techniques based on a “prearranged plan or understanding” between the parties
to a trust. See Donald P. DiCarlo, Jr., What Estate Planners Need to Know About the Step Transaction
Doctrine, 45 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 355, 355 (2010). Ideally, a trustee is not merely a “potted
plant,” but the extent to which trustees serve as an actual check on beneficiary demands is worthy of
further empirical study.
64. See supra Section II.A.
65. See Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184–86 (explaining a settlor who borrowed trust corpus in
exchange for a promissory note was treated “as the owner of the portion of [the trust] represented by
[his] promissory note.” (emphasis added)).
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Revenue, the treatment of the other half of the trust’s income and gains is
uncertain.
2. The Intent of the Washington Legislature
The initial proposal from Governor Inslee did not intend for this
discrepancy between grantor and non-grantor trusts to exist. A “Q&A”
from the 2019–2021 budget proposal stated:
Because a [non-grantor] trust is not an individual subject to the
Washington capital gains tax, no Washington capital gains tax would
be due on gains retained by the trust. However, in some cases a nongrantor trust will distribute income that represents gain from the sale
of capital assets rather than retain the income. Individual
beneficiaries will need to report distributed long-term capital gain
income under the proposed Washington capital gains tax.66

This approach would have been straightforward and logical: “States
typically impose tax on a beneficiary in the year in which the beneficiary
receives the income from the trust.”67 Deferral that might otherwise benefit
taxpayers who delay trust distributions could have been addressed via
“throwback taxes” on the trust’s accumulated income. For example, both
New York and California impose a throwback tax on distributions to a
resident beneficiary based on income accumulated within the trust in prior
years.68
3. The Logistical and Constitutional Complications of Applying the Tax
to Trustees and Beneficiaries
The logistics of imposing the capital gains tax on the beneficiaries of
a non-grantor trust can be complicated. As an example, assume the trustee
of a non-grantor trust sells an interest in a Washington LLC, triggering
long-term capital gain, and distributes none of the proceeds. As a complex
trust, the trust will pay federal capital gains tax in the year of the sale. If
66. Capital Gains Tax Q&A (2019-21 Proposal), OFF. OF FIN. MGMT. (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://ofm.wa.gov/budget/state-budgets/gov-inslees-proposed-2019-21-budgets/proposed-2019-21budget-and-policy-highlights/revenue-changes/capital-gains-tax-qa [https://perma.cc/G89P-KC7F];
accord Capital Gains Tax Proposal Q&A, OFF. OF FIN. MGMT. (Mar. 15, 2021),
https://ofm.wa.gov/budget/state-budgets/gov-inslees-proposed-2021-23-budgets/highlightsgovernor-inslees-2021-23-proposed-budget/revenue-changes-proposed-21-23-budget/capital-gainstax-proposal-qa [https://perma.cc/U6UF-759E]. Identical language was present in the 2017–19 FAQs.
See OFF. OF FIN. MGMT., PROPOSED WASHINGTON CAPITAL GAINS TAX 3 (2015).
67. Brief Amicus Curiae for the American College of Trust and Estate Counsel in Support of
Neither Party at 14, North Carolina Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Fam. Tr., 139
S. Ct. 2213 (2019) (No. 18-457) [hereinafter ACTEC Brief].
68. Id. at 15–17; see N.Y. TAX LAW § 612(b)(40) (McKinney 2021); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §
17745 (West 2021).
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the beneficiaries are Washington domiciliaries, should they be required to
realize Washington capital gains in the year of the sale, despite the fact
they have received no distributions? Or, if the trustee distributes the
proceeds of the sale in a later year, should the beneficiaries be required to
pay then? What if some beneficiaries are no longer domiciliaries of
Washington at that time? Alternatively, assume the trustee sells an interest
in a Delaware LLC and distributes the proceeds of the sale five years later
to the beneficiaries, one of whom is a Washington domiciliary. Should the
Washington beneficiary pay tax on the capital gain in the year of receipt?
What if the beneficiary was domiciled in Oregon in the year of the sale,
but then moved to Washington by the year of the distribution—or vice
versa?
These questions also implicate federal and state constitutional
questions. While such a discrepancy is probably not a violation of the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,69 there are serious
Due Process Clause concerns. The Due Process Clause “requires some
definite link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person,
property or transaction it seeks to tax.”70 “A statute of a [s]tate which
undertakes to tax things wholly beyond her jurisdiction or control conflicts
with the Fourteenth Amendment.”71 The Court explains:
In sum, when assessing a state tax premised on the in-state residency
of a constituent of a trust—whether beneficiary, settlor, or trustee—
the Due Process Clause demands attention to the particular
relationship between the resident and the trust assets that the State
seeks to tax. Because each individual fulfills different functions in
the creation and continuation of the trust, the specific features of that
relationship sufficient to sustain a tax may vary depending on
whether the resident is a settlor, beneficiary, or trustee.72

69. Tax statutes are almost always upheld under the federal Equal Protection Clause. The U.S.
Supreme Court has given states broad power to enact tax classifications:
This Court has often admonished against such interferences with the State’s fiscal policies
under the Equal Protection Clause:“ . . . [T]he passage of time has only served to
underscore the wisdom of that recognition of the large area of discretion which is needed
by a legislature in formulating sound tax policies…. It has… been pointed out that in
taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in
classification.… [T]he presumption . . . can be overcome only by the most explicit
demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against
particular persons and classes . . . .”
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 40–41 (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309
U.S. 83, 87–88 (1940)).
70. Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954).
71. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 92 (1929).
72. North Carolina Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Fam. Tr., 139 S. Ct.
2213, 2222 (2019)
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There are also Commerce Clause limitations on state taxation. The
standard, set by the Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, is
whether “the tax is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus with the
taxing State, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and is fairly related to the services provided by the State.”73
“Substantial nexus” runs parallel to the Due Process Clause’s “minimum
contacts” requirement, and requires that the taxpayer “avail[] itself of the
substantial privilege of carrying on business in that jurisdiction.”74
a. Constitutional Limitations on the Taxation of Trustees
States imposing taxes on trusts generally do so based on the residence
of the settlor or trustees.75 Numerous state courts in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century confronted the issue of tax jurisdiction with
application to trustees; most concluded that a trust could be subject to tax
in the state where a trustee resided, including one case from the
Washington Supreme Court.76 The U.S. Supreme Court “has never denied
the constitutional power of the trustee’s domicile to subject them to
property taxation . . . . On the contrary, [the] Court . . . has declared that
both the decedent’s domicile and that of the trustee are free to tax.”77

73. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977).
74. Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 11 (2009) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
75. See ACTEC Brief, supra note 67, at 5.
76. See City of Walla Walla v. Moore, 47 P. 753, 754 (1897). The issue of whether multiple
states can tax a trust based on the various residences of the trust’s multiple trustees has not been
directly addressed by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has upheld a state’s valid taxation of a
trust’s income based on the residence of the trustee and the simultaneous taxation by another state on
distributions received by a trust beneficiary, even though such a conclusion clearly resulted in double
taxation. See Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19, 22–23 (1938); Charles L. B.
Lowndes, The Tax Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1938 Term, 88 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1939).
[D]epending on the circumstances, a trust could easily satisfy one or more of the residency
criteria of multiple states where the settlor, trustee, beneficiary, and assets have a nexus.
This overlapping effect creates the problem of trusts that are treated as resident trusts in
more than one state and thus the trustees of such trusts are potentially subject to multiple
state income tax levies without an offsetting tax credit or other mechanism to allay the
impact of double taxation. Although [the] Court has held that state taxation by multiple
jurisdictions is federally constitutional in the transfer tax context, it has not addressed state
residency-based income taxation by multiple jurisdictions.
ACTEC Brief, supra note 67, at 12–13. Presumably such a result would violate the Commerce Clause
unless fairly apportioned between the states asserting tax authority. See generally Bradley W.
Joondeph, The Meaning of Fair Apportionment and the Prohibition on Extraterritorial State Taxation,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 149 (2002).
77. See Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357, 370, 373 (1939); Note, State Power to Impose a
Property Tax on the Interest of a Beneficiary of a Trust—A Problem in Double Taxation, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 539, 539 n.1 (1930).
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In Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed the Due Process Clause regarding the taxation of trustees.78
George Warren died testate in New York.79 His will established a
testamentary trust, and two trustees were appointed by the New York
Surrogate’s Court.80 One trustee resided in New York and the other in
Rhode Island. The sole asset of the trust consisted of shares in a New
Jersey company. The City of Newport, Rhode Island, imposed a personal
property tax against one-half of the trust’s assets based on the
proportionate residences of the trustees.81 The Supreme Court upheld the
tax, concluding that the courts of Rhode Island extended some benefit to
the Rhode Island resident trustee:
The trustee of today moves freely from state to state. The settlor’s
residence may be one state, the seat of a trust another state and the
trustee or trustees may live in still another jurisdiction or may
constantly change their residence. . . . The legal interest of the trustee
in the res is a distinct right. . . . The trustee as the owner of this legal
interest in the res may incur obligations in the administration of the
trust enforceable against him, personally. . . . [T]hird parties dealing
with the trustee on trust matters or beneficiaries may need to proceed
directly against the trustee as an individual for matters arising out of
his relation to the trust. Or the resident trustee may need the benefit
of the Rhode Island law to enforce trust claims against a Rhode Island
resident. . . . Consequently, we must conclude that Rhode Island does
offer benefit and protection through its law to the resident trustee as
the owner of intangibles.82

b. Constitutional Limitations on the Taxation of Beneficiaries
In the context of taxation of trust beneficiaries, the due process
analysis focuses on the extent of the in-state beneficiary’s right to control,
possess, enjoy, or receive trust assets. “When a State seeks to base its tax
on the in-state residence of a trust beneficiary, the Due Process Clause
demands a pragmatic inquiry into what exactly the beneficiary controls or
possesses and how that interest relates to the object of the State’s tax.”83
The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue in a series of cases in
the early twentieth century. In Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Virginia, a
settlor domiciled in and resident of Virginia transferred securities to a
78. See Greenough v. Tax Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 (1947).
79. Id. at 488.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 493–96.
83. North Carolina Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Fam. Tr., 139 S. Ct.
2213, 2221–22 (2019).
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revocable trust established for the benefit of his two sons, naming Safe
Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, Maryland, as trustee.84 The sons had no
right to control the trust assets or receive the income from trust assets
during the years in question.85 Virginia sought to impose a tax on the
trust’s income, which the Virginia courts upheld.86 On appeal, the U.S.
Supreme Court held that the tax violated the Fourteenth Amendment,
concluding that the securities had “acquired a situs separate from that of
the beneficial owners.”87 In Brooke v. Norfolk, the Court rejected a similar
attempt by Virginia to tax the entire trust corpus based upon a
beneficiary’s residence in Virginia when all the assets were held in
Maryland (also by the Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore).88 By
contrast, in Maguire v. Trefry, the Supreme Court upheld a tax on the
beneficiary of a trust where income of the trust was distributed to her.89
In North Carolina v. Kaestner, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the
mere physical presence of a beneficiary in a state is insufficient to subject
the trust assets to income tax.90 That is, a beneficiary’s mere presence in a
state did not give the trust sufficient minimum contacts with the state to
justify taxation of the trust’s assets under the Due Process Clause.91
Therefore, it seems unlikely that Washington could assert its capital gains
84. See Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1929).
85. See id. at 91 (“[N]obody within Virginia has present right to [the securities’] control or
possession, or to receive income therefrom, or to cause them to be brought physically within her
borders.”). The settlor’s two sons were each entitled to take their half share after turning age 25. See
id. at 89.
86. See id. at 89–90.
87. Id. at 93. Justices Stone and Brandeis, concluding in the judgment, would have stopped short
of the Court’s holding:
[T]he Virginia assessment was levied against a trustee domiciled in Maryland upon
securities held by it in trust in its exclusive possession and control there, and so is forbidden
as an attempt to tax property without the jurisdiction. But the question whether the
Fourteenth Amendment forbids a tax on the beneficiaries, in Virginia, where they are
domiciled, measured by their equitable interests, seems to me not to be presented by the
record and so, under the settled rule of decision of this Court, ought not now to be decided.
Id. at 95 (Stone, J., concurring). Justice Holmes would have upheld the Virginia Court of Appeals’
decision. See id. at 96–97 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“To be sure the trustee having the legal title and
possession of the bonds in Maryland may be taxed there. But that does not affect the right of Virginia
by reason of anything that I know of in the Constitution of the United States.”).
88. See Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27, 28–29 (1928). Interestingly, Justice Holmes delivered
the opinion of the Court. Virginia may have taken heed from Holmes’ dissent in Safe Deposit in their
attempt to tax all the trust assets in Brooke. As the Court would later hold in Kaestner, Virginia’s
attempt to tax any of the trust’s assets based on a beneficiary’s mere presence in the state would also
have been unconstitutional. See infra notes 90–93.
89. See Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12, 16–17 (1920), aff’g Maguire v. Tax Comm’r, 230 Mass.
503 (1918).
90. See North Carolina Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Fam. Tr., 139 S. Ct.
2213, 2221 (2019).
91. See id. Without minimum contacts, the state also lacked substantial nexus required by the
Commerce Clause. See id.
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tax against a resident or domiciliary beneficiary unless the beneficiary had
some ability to demand the trust income or to possess, control, or otherwise
enjoy some portion of the trust assets.92 Of course, if the beneficiaries in
Kaestner had received income from the trust, it would have been taxable.93
c. State Constitutional Limitations
Unique and special considerations apply to tax laws under the
Washington State constitution. Article VII, Section 1 of the Washington
constitution requires that “[a]ll taxes shall be uniform upon the same class
of property within the territorial limits of the authority levying the
tax . . . .”94 Article VII, Section 2 provides that no property tax may exceed
1% of the fair value of the property.95 The tax uniformity mandate and
percentage limitation apply broadly to “property taxes” (including income
taxes)96 but do not apply to excise taxes.97 An excise tax is imposed on “a
particular use or enjoyment of property or the shifting from one to another
of any power or privilege incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of
property.”98 “[T]he obligation to pay an excise is based upon the voluntary
action of the person taxed in performing the act, enjoying the privilege or
engaging in the occupation which is the subject of the excise, and the
element of absolute and unavoidable demand, as in the case of a property
tax, is lacking.”99 Two distinct issues result from the intersection between
Article VII, Section 1 of the Washington constitution and the Washington
capital gains tax. First, the tax may be upheld as an excise tax but will face
nearly insurmountable challenge if recharacterized as a property tax.
Second, if interpreted as an excise tax, the law likely cannot permit the
imposition of the tax against the beneficiaries of a non-grantor trust.
92. Id. at 2222–23.
93. Id. at 2223 (“If [the beneficiaries] had [received income from the trust], such income would
have been taxable.”); Maguire, 253 U.S. at 17; Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Virginia, 305 U.S. 19,
23 (1938).
94. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 1; see also WADE J. NEWHOUSE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL
UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAXATION, 572–91 (1959) (discussing history of Washington’s
uniformity requirement).
95. WASH. CONST. art. VII, § 2.
96. “In a series of decisions dating back to 1933, the Washington Supreme Court has
unequivocally held income is property, a tax on income is a tax on property, taxes on property must
be uniformly levied, and a graduated income tax is not uniform. Therefore, the Washington
Constitution bars any graduated income tax.” Kunath v. City of Seattle, 444 P.3d 1235, 1239 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2019) (citing Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 235 P.2d 173, 175 (Wash. 1951)); Apartment Operators
Ass’n v. Schumacher, 351 P.2d 124, 125 (1960) (“[A] tax on rental income is a tax on property, and
not an excise tax.”); see generally Hugh D. Spitzer, A Washington State Income Tax—Again?, 16
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 515 (1993).
97. See Dean v. Lehman, 18 P.3d 523, 530–31 (Wash. 2001) (citing Black v. State, 406 P.2d
761, 763 (Wash. 1965)).
98. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352 (1945).
99. Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324, 332 (Wash. 1995) (emphasis added).
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First, critics allege that the new capital gains tax is unconstitutional
if properly recharacterized as a tax on income (i.e., a property tax under
Washington constitutional law). Two lawsuits have already been filed
challenging the constitutionality of the tax.100 The criticism is hardly
new.101 One Washington state representative has pointed out that the tax is
based on the federal income tax return, and the IRS explicitly stated:
“[C]apital gains are treated as income under the [federal] tax code and
taxed as such.”102
The character of a tax—excise or property—is “determined by its
incidents, not by its name.”103 There are compelling arguments that the
capital gains tax should be respected as an excise tax. For instance, the
Washington Supreme Court has upheld estate and inheritance taxes as
valid excise taxes on the right or privilege to transfer and receive property
upon death.104 But if considered a property tax, the 7% capital gains tax
far exceeds the 1% limitation and fails to tax gains uniformly by excluding
a taxpayer’s first $250,000 in gain per year.
Second, if the new capital gains tax is treated as an excise tax, the tax
cannot properly apply to the beneficiaries of a non-grantor trust. An excise
tax may only constitutionally apply upon “the voluntary action of the
person taxed.”105 The engrossed senate bill stated that “[t]he excise tax on
capital gains is a tax on the one-time, voluntary sale or exchange of a
capital asset, not a tax on ownership of the asset itself. This excise tax is
paid only by those individuals who engage in voluntary sales or exchanges
of Washington capital assets . . . .”106 This language was removed by the
House before the law was passed. The beneficiaries of an irrevocable, nongrantor trust cannot reasonably be considered to have entered into a
“voluntary action” if the trustees of the trust sell property triggering capital

100. See Quinn v. State, No. 21-2-00075-09 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Douglas Cnty., Apr. 28, 2021);
Clayton v. State, No. 21-2-00087-09 (Wash. Sup. Ct., Douglas Cnty., May 20, 2021).
101. “Democrats . . . propose the tax as a progressive source of new revenue . . . . Republicans
and their allies attack it as a volatile and unconstitutional form of an income tax.” Austin Jenkins, WA
Democrats Push for Capital Gains Tax in a Year When ‘Tax’ Doesn’t Seem like a Bad Word, NPR
(Mar. 1, 2021), https://www.kuow.org/stories/wa-democrats-push-for-capital-gains-tax-in-a-yearwhen-tax-doesn-t-seem-like-a-bad-word [https://perma.cc/4DQ7-LMAB].
102. Letter from Paul Axelson, IRS Legis. Affs. Off., to Rep. Dan Newhouse (Sept. 25, 2018)
(on file with the Dept. of Treasury).
103. Harbour Vill. Apartments v. City of Mukilteo, 989 P.2d 542, 544 (Wash. 1999).
104. See In re Estate of Sherwood, 211 P. 734 (Wash. 1922); In re Estate of Ellis, 14 P.2d 37,
39 (Wash. 1932) (“The charge is not on the property itself, although the value of the property
determines the amount of the tax, but rather upon the right or privilege to transmit or receive the
property.”).
105. See Covell v. City of Seattle, 905 P.2d 324, 332 (Wash. 1995).
106. See Engrossed Substitute S.B. 5096, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. § 101(2) (Wash. 2021).
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gains.107 If the new tax were imposed on the beneficiaries of a non-grantor
trust, there would be an unconstitutional disconnect between the incidence
of the tax (the beneficiaries) and the voluntary action triggering the tax (by
the trustee).108
It is uncertain whether the same limitation might apply to the grantor
of a grantor trust. Presumably, much like the beneficiaries of a trust, the
grantor also has no power to compel the trustees to sell or refrain from
selling any particular asset.109 Perhaps by retaining the powers sufficient
to trigger grantor trust status for federal income tax purposes, the grantor
has similarly retained sufficient beneficial powers to justify the imposition
of the Washington capital gains tax as a matter of Washington
constitutional law.
d. The Inequity of the New Tax
One of the fundamentals of tax policy fairness is the principle of
horizontal equity, which “demands that similarly situated individuals face
similar tax burdens.”110 The newly enacted Washington capital gains tax
fails to follow this fundamental principle.
The following two examples demonstrate the inequity created by the
new capital gains tax. In one case, imagine a settlor establishes an
irrevocable trust and retains grantor powers sufficient to cause her to be
deemed the owner for income tax purposes under Code Section 671 (Trust
A). Conversely, assume another settlor establishes an irrevocable trust
over which he retains no grantor trust powers (Trust B). Each trust is
established for the benefit of each settlor’s two children. The settlors of
both trusts are Washington domiciliaries, as are all trustees and
beneficiaries. Both trusts grant the trustee entirely discretionary
distribution powers and are therefore complex trusts. Each settlor transfers
to his or her trust a 100% interest in a Washington LLC with a basis of $0
and a fair market value of $10,000,000. The trustee of each trust sells each
107. Consider High Tide Seafoods v. State, 725 P.2d 411, 413–14 (Wash. 1986), where the State
imposed an excise tax on the “first possession” of fish and shellfish for commercial purposes after
such fish or shellfish had landed. The court upheld the tax as a proper excise tax on the transfer of
ownership from the fisherman to the first commercial owner. Id.
108. See Wash. Pub. Ports Ass’n v. Wash. Dep’t of Revenue, 62 P.3d 462, 469–70 (Wash. 2003).
109. The extent to which this presumption withholds empirical scrutiny is debatable, particularly
in the case of grantors who nominate “friendly” trustees. The IRS has attempted to push against this
tendency and estate planners have settled into the comfortable position of advising that trustees may
exercise nearly discretionary distribution powers so long either: (1) the trustees are neither “related”
or “subordinate,” within the meaning of Code Section 672, or (2) the distribution powers are limited
to an “ascertainable standard.” See David Barbour & Barbara G. McComas, Selecting a Trustee:
Income Tax and Estate Tax Considerations, 33 SW L.J. 635, 638, 646–47 (1979).
110. David Elkins, Horizontal Equity as a Principle of Tax Theory, 24 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
43, 43–45 (2006).
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LLC interest in August of Year 1 and distributes all the proceeds of the
sale to the beneficiaries in February of Year 2. Assume the holding period
of both LLCs (including the settlors’ tacked-on holding periods) is more
than one year. In Year 1, the settlor of Trust A will pay $2,000,000 in
federal capital gains tax111 and $682,500112 in Washington state capital
gains tax. The trustee of Trust B will pay the same $2,000,000 in federal
capital gains but no Washington state capital gains. In Year 2, when the
trustee distributes the sale proceeds, the two beneficiaries of Trust A will
each receive $3,658,750, while the two beneficiaries of Trust B will each
receive $4,000,000.
III. PLANNING AROUND THE TAX
The newly enacted Washington capital gains tax does not present
difficultly for wealthy or sophisticated taxpayers. As described in Section
III.A, traditional tactics to avoid state income taxes are available to all
taxpayers, such as changing domicile (whether by the taxpayer or via
trust), timing of realization to net losses against gains, or deferring gain
recognition.
For ease of comparability, the strategies to avoid state taxes
discussed in Part III are all premised on the following basic fact pattern:
Assume Taxpayer X, domiciled in Washington, owns an interest in
Alpha LLC, a Washington limited liability company, worth $10 million
with a basis of $0. X’s interest in Alpha does not qualify as an interest in
a “qualified family-owned small business” for purposes of the statute.
Assuming a federal capital gains tax bracket of 20%, X would pay $2
million in federal capital gains tax and $682,500 in Washington capital
gains tax if X sold the Alpha interest. The same result would occur if
Taxpayer X transferred the Alpha interest to a grantor trust and the trustee
sold the LLC.
Typically, Taxpayer X might take significant discounts on the value
of Alpha as reported on his federal gift tax returns for lack of marketability
or lack of control. For simplicity, the value of Alpha remains undiscounted
in the discussion below.
A. The Straightforward Options
There are several relatively simple, straightforward techniques
Taxpayer X might pursue to reduce or eliminate his Washington state
capital gains tax. The topics in Section III.A are non-transferatory, in that
they do not require the client to transfer ownership of their assets. Tactics
111. Assuming a 20% federal capital gains tax bracket.
112. ($10,000,000 - $250,000) × 7%.
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in Section III.B involve improved tax savings, but at the sacrifice of legal
ownership.
1. Changing Domicile
The most straightforward answer to the imposition of a tax
throughout history has simply been to leave. Jurisdictional tax arbitrage
has, in the international arena, lead to what is called “base erosion.”113
States historically have sought to keep corporate rates competitive (i.e.,
low) to incentivize keeping corporate profits within their borders and
disincentivize companies from moving profits to offshore low- (or no-) tax
jurisdictions, which would otherwise “erode” their tax bases. The effort to
counteract this international trend has proven difficult.114
A similar effect occurs sub-nationally within the United States, albeit
to a lesser extent. Certain states have low (or no) income taxes, which
draws individuals and entities with wealth and income that are able and
willing to relocate.115 For example, for individual income taxes,
individuals working in New York City could relocate to New Jersey to
avoid New York City local taxes and reduce state income taxes. Also, D.C.
employees could relocate to Virginia or Maryland to avoid paying the
higher D.C. income tax rate. The same sort of tax avoidance may occur
with respect to estate taxes, with individuals fleeing high estate tax
jurisdictions (e.g., New York, Pennsylvania, Oregon, Washington) to
states without estate or inheritance taxes (e.g., Florida, Texas, Arizona).116
A taxpayer could simply change domiciles or residences and avoid
the Washington capital gains tax. For income tax purposes, domiciliaries
are always potentially subject to tax in the state of their domicile.117
Residents of a state are also generally subject to income tax in that state.118
“Residency,” for state income tax purposes, is frequently determined by a
hard line test based on number of days spent in a given state.119 The new
113. See generally Jeffrey M. Kadet, BEPS: A Primer on Where It Came from and Where It’s
Going, 150 TAX NOTES 793 (2016).
114. See, e.g., OECD, OECD/G20 INCLUSIVE FRAMEWORK ON BEPS; Rebecca M. Kysar,
Critiquing (and Repairing) the New International Tax Regime, 128 YALE L.J.F. 339 (2018); Yariv
Brauner, What the BEPS, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55 (2014).
115. In the context of trusts, the states of Alaska, Delaware, Nevada, and South Dakota appear
as having abolished or greatly reduced the common law rule against perpetuities, eliminated or reduced
state income tax for non-residents, and offered strong creditor and spendthrift protections. See, e.g.,
Jocelyn Margolin Borowsky, A Comparison of the Leading Trust Jurisdictions, 37 TAX MGMT. ESTS.,
GIFTS & TR. J. 233 (2012).
116. Although this may be attributable to a desire for warmer climates in retirement rather than
true tax strategery.
117. See JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN & WALTER HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION ¶ 20.03 (3d ed.
2001).
118. See id.
119. See id.
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law defines “resident” as an individual who (1) is domiciled in
Washington, unless they spent fewer than 31 days in Washington and their
permanent place of abode is outside Washington, or (2) maintains a place
of abode in Washington and was physically present for more than 183 days
during the tax year.120 Thus, going back to the previous example, Taxpayer
X could change his domicile to Alaska and ensure that he spends no more
than 183 days in Washington in the year Alpha is sold.
2. Netting Losses or Deferring Gain
A client may refuse to change domiciles and decline to transfer
control of their assets over to an irrevocable trust.121 However, such a
client may be amenable to timing the sale of assets to net capital gains
against various capital losses. The materials written on tax-loss harvesting
are multitude.
Where tax cannot be easily avoided, the goal is to defer it to the
extent possible. Under Internal Revenue Code Section 453, income from
a sale of property with payments over one year is reported under the
“installment method,” unless the taxpayer elects immediate gain
recognition under Section 453(d).122 If the circumstances of the deal
permit, Taxpayer X could elect to sell Alpha in exchange for equal
payments of $1 million over a ten-year term. Each year, X would report
$1 million in federal taxable gain but only $750,000 in Washington capital
gains. Over ten years, this approach would exclude $2.5 million from the
capital gains tax, for a tax savings of $175,000 (at a 7% Washington capital
gains tax rate). Note that there may be interest charges associated with the
installment method, which is discussed in greater detail in Section III.B.3.
This approach is relatively inefficient, and it may prove difficult to
structure sales of business interests over extended periods.
B. Planning Involving Trusts
The strategies in Section III.B provide improved tax saving options
over the straightforward options in Section III.A; however, the following
methods critically depend on the client’s willingness to transfer their
interest to an irrevocable trust. If the taxpayer cannot be persuaded to part
with ownership of the assets, little more can be done aside from the
straightforward options listed above.

120. Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 4(10)(a), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1231.
121. A remarkably frustrating situation where the tax tail cannot seem to wag the dog.
122. 26 U.S.C. § 453.
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1. Charitable Remainder Trusts
This option is not so much a technique to avoid the Washington
capital gains tax as it is an estate planning strategy that avoids all federal
and state income and capital gains taxes. Charitable remainder trusts are
exempt from federal income taxation.123 A charitable remainder trust is a
“split interest” trust, in which the income interest is paid to one or more
non-charitable beneficiaries for a term of years (up to 20 years) or for life,
and the remainder interest is held for one or more charitable
beneficiaries.124 The present value of the charitable remainder interest
must be at least 10% of the initial value of the property transferred to the
trust.125 The income interest can either be structured as a fixed annuity
percentage (a Charitable Remainder Annuity Trust or CRAT) or a variable
percentage of the trust assets (a Charitable Remainder Unitrust or
CRUT).126 In either case, the minimum payout percentage must be more
than 5% and less than 50%.127 For CRATs based on a lifetime annuity, the
IRS also requires that the trust have less than a 5% chance of exhaustion
based on the Section 7520 rate at the time of transfer.128 Such trusts may
avoid this test by including a trust provision that provides that the trust will
terminate and transfer all assets to the charitable remainder beneficiary if
the assets of the trust fall below 10% of the initial trust assets.129
Because almost every state bases its income tax on either federal
adjusted gross income or federal taxable income as a starting point for
calculating its own taxes, capital gains generated by a charitable remainder
trust are also generally exempt from state taxation.130 Although charitable
remainder trusts are not subject to income tax, payments from charitable
remainder trusts to the income beneficiaries are generally subject to
income tax.131 The Washington capital gains tax also uses federal capital
gains as its starting point.132 Therefore, in the example provided above, if
123. 26 U.S.C. § 664(c)(1).
124. See Treas. Reg. § 1.664-1(a)(1)(i).
125. 26 U.S.C. § 664(d)(1)(D).
126. See 26 U.S.C. § 664(d)(1)–(2).
127. See 26 U.S.C. § 664(d)(1)(A), (2)(A).
128. See Rev. Rul. 77-374, 1977-2 C.B. 330–31.
129. See Rev. Proc. 2016-42, 2016-34 I.R.B. 269.
130. See 26 U.S.C. § 664(c)(1).
131. See 26 U.S.C. § 664(b). Note that charitable remainder trusts are “split interest” trusts and
are treated as private foundations, subject to the restrictions on private foundations and potentially
liable for taxes imposed on private foundations in Code Sections 4941, 4943, 4944, and 4945. See 26
U.S.C. § 4947(a)(2). All split interest trusts are required to file annual information reports with the
IRS (Form 5227). See 26 U.S.C. § 6034.
132. See Capital Gains Tax Act, ch. 196, § 4(1), (13), 2021 Wash. Sess. Laws 1229, 1230–31.
(“Washington capital gains” is based on an individual’s “adjusted capital gains,” which in turn is based
on the individual’s “federal net long-term capital gain”).
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Taxpayer X transferred his Alpha interest to a charitable remainder trust,
the trust’s subsequent sale of Alpha would not trigger federal or state taxes.
The annuity payable from the trust is based on the trust term or the
annuitant’s life expectancy (based on IRS actuarial tables) and the
discount rate (based on the statutory rate published each month commonly
referred to as the “Section 7520 rate”). Assuming Taxpayer X is age sixtyfive and the Section 7520 rate for the month of transfer is 1.0%, X could
transfer Alpha to a CRAT paying a 5% annuity for the remainder of his
life ($500,000 per year) and would be entitled to a charitable deduction of
$2,057,850.133 The CRAT’s subsequent sale of Alpha would not result in
any federal income taxes or Washington capital gains tax. The annuity
distributions would still be subject to federal tax, but would be below the
$250,000 Washington capital gains exemption (assuming the distributions
are from trust income).
Charitable remainder trusts may appear unsuitable for assets not
currently generating sufficient cash flow, but CRUTs provide additional
flexibilities. There are four varieties of CRUTs: (1) fixed-percentage
CRUTs (the standard CRUT); (2) net-income CRUTs (sometimes called
NICRUTs); (3) net-income with makeup CRUTs (sometimes called
NIMCRUTs); and (4) “flip” CRUTs (which starts as a NICRUT or
NIMCRUT but converts to a standard CRUT after a specified date or
event).134 A NICRUT and NIMCRUT pays the income beneficiaries a
lesser of the trust’s income or a percentage of the trust’s assets.135 There is
not space here to discuss the nuances of these various types of CRUTs, but
as a general matter, a “flip” CRUT would permit Taxpayer X to transfer
Alpha to a NICRUT that converts after Alpha’s sale to a standard CRUT.
The CRUT would only be required to pay X net income from Alpha until
Alpha’s sale, after which it could pay X a fixed percentage of the trust
assets for the remainder of X’s lifetime. The value of charitable remainder
trusts has been diminished recently due to low Section 7520 rates.
However, charitable remainder trusts may be a valuable option depending
on the circumstances of a particular client.
2. Gifting to a Non-Grantor Trust
The most viable option would be for Taxpayer X to gift his Alpha
interest to a non-grantor trust. Each person has a unified federal estate and
133. This transaction would not satisfy the 5% exhaustion test in Rev. Rul. 77-374, so the
contingency provision in Rev. Proc. 2016-42 would be required.
134. See Robert I. Ury, Charitable Remainder Trusts: An Overview and Selected Topics, 5 J.
TAX PRAC. & PROC. 21, 21–24 (2003); Wendy C. Gerzog, The Times They are Not A-Changin’:
Reforming the Charitable Split-Interest Rules (Again), 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 849, 854–855 (2010).
135. See 26 U.S.C. § 664(d)(3).
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gift tax exemption.136 As of 2021, the exemption is $11.7 million per
person. Taxpayer X would file a U.S. Gift Tax Return (Form 709)
reporting the transfer, utilizing $10 million of X’s available exemption. If
married to a U.S. citizen, Taxpayer X and his spouse could elect under
Section 2513 to treat the transfer as made one-half by each.
As discussed in Section II.B, neither the trustee nor the beneficiaries
of a non-grantor trust are likely subject to the capital gains tax. If there are
concerns the state may try to impose tax on the trustee, the settlor could
name an institutional trustee or a non-Washington trustee (or a nonWashington institutional trustee). Suppose Taxpayer X gifted Alpha to a
non-grantor trust managed by an Alaskan trust company. The trustee’s
subsequent sale of the stock would trigger only federal capital gains tax,
taxable either to the beneficiaries (if distributed) or to the trustee (if
retained). The trustee’s distribution of the net proceeds of the sale to the
beneficiaries would not trigger Washington capital gains, even if the
beneficiaries are Washington domiciliaries or residents.
One major downside of gifting is that the transferee takes a
“carryover” basis in the property received. For example, if Taxpayer X
gifted Alpha interests to a non-grantor trust, X would report a taxable gift
of $10 million on their gift tax return and would correspondingly reduce
their estate by $10 million, but the trust would continue to have the same
$0 basis that Taxpayer X had in Alpha. The trustee’s sale of Alpha stock
in a later year would trigger massive capital gain. Instead, if Taxpayer X
held the Alpha stock until his death, when it was worth $10 million, X’s
beneficiaries would receive Alpha with a stepped-up basis of $10 million
and the entire built-in gain would be eliminated.
3. Installment Sale to Non-Grantor Trust
Rather than gifting Alpha to a non-grantor trust, Taxpayer X could
sell the Alpha interest to the trust (e.g., for cash, a promissory note, or a
private annuity). If X sold all of the Alpha interest in one year, federal and
state capital gains tax would be immediately due. However, if X elected
to sell the Alpha interest over an extended period in exchange for
installment payments, he could greatly reduce or eliminate his state capital
gains tax liability. While it might not be feasible to structure a sale of a
business interest to a third party over several years, sale of the company to
a non-grantor trust over time may be possible, especially if coupled with
gifting.

136. “Unified” because taxable gifts made during life will reduce the remaining available
exemption at death.

48

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 45:1

As discussed above, the sale of property with payments structured
over one year is generally reported under the installment method of
Section 453. If Taxpayer X has several years before being ready to
consider selling Alpha, he could structure the sale of Alpha to a nongrantor trust in exchange for payments over an extended period. Each year,
X would report federal capital gains but only Washington capital gains
over the $250,000 exclusion. Taxpayer X could also structure sales each
year, but a single sale in the first year with payments extended over
multiple years will shift the appreciation in Alpha over the term to the
buyer. The trust’s subsequent sale of Alpha will only result in federal
capitals gain on any appreciation over the trust’s cost basis (i.e., purchase
price) from Taxpayer X. However, if the trust sells Alpha before the
installment payments to X are completed, all outstanding gain may be
accelerated.137
The tax code imposes an interest charge for installment sales where
the outstanding deferred tax liability exceed $5 million each year.138 The
$5 million threshold is doubled for married individuals.139 The interest
charge is based on the underpayment rate at the end of the taxpayer’s
taxable year.140 Assuming a 20% capital gains tax rate, the deferred tax
liability from Taxpayer X’s sale of Alpha would be $2 million. Therefore,
there would be no Section 453A interest charge.
4. Conversion Between Non-Grantor and Grantor Trust
Suppose Taxpayer X engages in one of the transactions described
above by transferring his Alpha LLC interests to a non-grantor trust
(whether by gift or sale). After the trust’s subsequent sale of the Alpha
interest—incurring federal capital gains tax, but no Washington capital
gains tax—any subsequent income earned by the trust would be taxed at
the trust income tax rates, which may be much higher than Taxpayer X’s
marginal income tax rate. However, it may be possible to convert the nongrantor trust into a grantor trust.
Several practitioners and IRS administrative decisions have
addressed “toggling” between grantor and non-grantor status.141 “[T]he
137. See 26 U.S.C. § 453(e).
138. See 26 U.S.C. § 453A; Amy I. Kinkaid & Charles E. Federanich, Application of Interest
Charge for Installment Sale Obligations, THE TAX ADVISOR (July 31, 2014),
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2014/aug/tax-clinic-06.html [https://perma.cc/7BDJ-7YF4].
139. See TAM 9853002.
140. See 26 U.S.C. § 453A(c)(2).
141. See, e.g., Akers, Blattmachr, & Boyle, supra note 48, at 271–78; Howard M. Zaritsky,
Toggling Made Easy—Modifying a Trust to Create a Grantor Trust, 36 EST. PLAN. 48 (2009); Laura
H. Peebles, Mysteries of the Blinking Trust, TR. & ESTS., at 16 (Sept. 2008); David L. Case,
Conversion from Non-Grantor to Grantor Trust: Tax Issues, 46 EST. PLAN. 11 (2019).
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most popular method of conversion to a grantor trust is changing the trust
by statutory modification or decanting to add a Section 675(4)(C)
substitution-of-assets power . . . .”142 The newly added substitution power
will not, by itself, cause inclusion in the grantor’s estate so long as
the trustee has a fiduciary obligation (under local law or the trust
instrument) to ensure the grantor’s compliance with the terms of this
power by satisfying itself that the properties acquired and substituted
by the grantor are in fact of equivalent value and further provided that
the substitution power cannot be exercised in a manner that can shift
benefits among the trust beneficiaries.143

The conversion to grantor trust status should not trigger income tax
gain, although there may be little gain remaining after the trust’s sale of
the Alpha interests.144 This conclusion is not entirely immune from the
step transaction doctrine.145
CONCLUSION
The Washington state legislature has sought for years to enact a
capital gains tax and finally succeeded this spring. The Washington state
constitution imposes a uniformity requirement on property taxes,
including income taxes, but not excise taxes. If the legislature expects its
characterization of the tax as an excise tax to be respected, the tax can only
be applied to the voluntary actions of taxpayers under the state
constitution. Based on the tax’s structure and the state definitional
requirements of excise taxes, the new capital gains tax should not apply to
either the trustees or beneficiaries of non-grantor trusts. The last part of
this Article explored several techniques that clients and their advisors may
pursue that might reduce or avoid the Washington capital gains tax. The
extent to which the Washington state legislature will (or even can) correct
these discrepancies remains to be seen.

142. See Case, supra note 141, at 13.
143. Rev. Rul. 2008-22, 2008-16 I.R.B. 796; see also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.200848006 (Nov. 27,
2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.200848015 (Nov. 28, 2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.200848016 (Nov. 28,
2008); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.200848017 (Nov. 28, 2008).
144. See Rev. Rul. 85-13, 1985-1 C.B. 184 (grantor taking a carryover basis in assets after
conversion to grantor trust status); I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201730012 (May 1, 2017) (no income tax
consequences resulting from agreement to modify non-grantor trust to provide third party with
substitution powers causing grantor trust status); I.R.S. Chief Couns. Advice 200923024 (Dec. 31,
2008) (“The conversion of a nongrantor trust to a grantor trust is not a transfer for income tax
purposes . . . that requires recognition of gain to the owner.”).
145. See Case, supra note 141, at 14–15. Moreover, there is some risk that the conversion could
cause recognition of gain because the beneficiaries’ interests are too substantially modified. See id. at
15.

